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Abstract
Protocols for secure group management are essential in applications concerned with
conﬁdential authenticated communication among coalition members, authenticated
group decisions, or the secure administration of group membership and access con-
trol. New languages and models are necessary to appropriately capture the concepts
of such protocols and make them amenable to formal analysis.
For this purpose, we developed MuCAPSL (Multicast Common Authentication
Protocol Speciﬁcation Language) and its intermediate language MuCIL (MuCAPSL
Intermediate Language). MuCIL is based on multiset term rewriting rules that
permit state changes to be presented concisely, and in a way that closely matches the
requirements of existing protocol analysis tools. With the help of the Group-Diﬃe-
Hellman protocol suite we illustrate how secure group communication principles are
modeled using multiset term rewriting.
Key words: Protocol speciﬁcation, secure group management
1 Introduction
Reliable multicast protocols have been developed as a means to provide reliable
ordered delivery of messages and membership services to a group of processes.
One challenge in building a multicast protocol for use over a public network
is security. Services such as conﬁdential authenticated communication among
coalition members, authenticated group decisions, or the secure administration
of group membership and access control are at the core of secure and reliable
group management. New protocols and frameworks have been designed to
create multicast groups on a network and support secure group communication
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(e.g., GDOI [2], GSAKMP [9]). Some existing key exchange protocols for
secure communication have been extended to the group setting (e.g., Group
Diﬃe-Hellman GDH [13] and its authenticated form A-GDH [1]).
There have been only a few results on the formal analysis of group man-
agement protocols (e.g., Pereira and Quisquater analyzed A-GDH [12] and
Meadows discovered security ﬂaws in early versions of GDOI [11]). The anal-
ysis of group management protocols poses new challenges for formal analysis
techniques. New language features and models are necessary to appropriately
capture the concepts of such protocols. MuCAPSL (Multicast Common Au-
thentication Protocol Speciﬁcation Language) and its intermediate language
MuCIL (MuCAPSL Intermediate Language) have been designed to meet these
needs. The underlying design principles are
(i) Providing a high-level, yet mathematically well founded, protocol lan-
guage that allows easy transformation of published descriptions of secure
group communication protocols into the formal language
(ii) Providing a single common interface language that could be used as the
input format for many formal analysis techniques or tools.
MuCAPSL and MuCIL are extensions of the CAPSL and CIL protocol
analysis eﬀort for unicast protocols [5,6,4]. MuCAPSL provides high-level
speciﬁcation concepts for multicast security protocols, such as message passing
using unicast and multicast addressing, group membership data, and basic
cryptographic operators. MuCIL is closer to state-transition representations
of protocols. It serves two purposes: to help deﬁne the semantics of MuCAPSL
in terms of multiset term rewriting, and to act as an interface through which
protocols speciﬁed in MuCAPSL can be analyzed by using a variety of tools.
The emphasis in this paper is on MuCIL and its term rewriting semantics.
We will illustrate the ideas of modeling group communication protocols with
the help of the Group-Diﬃe-Hellman (GDH) protocol suite. An overview of
GDH is given in Section 2. A semantic framework for multicast protocols is
provided in Section 3. Rewrite rule generation is covered in Section 4. Section
5 describes future work.
2 Group-Diﬃe-Hellman Protocol
We illustrate the semantic model with the help of the Group Diﬃe-Hellman
(GDH) protocol, which served as the basis for the Cliques protocol suite
[13,14]. GDH [13] is an extension of the two-party Diﬃe-Hellman key agree-
ment scheme to an arbitrary group size. The GDH protocol suite consists of
a key distribution algorithm and protocols for member addition and deletion.
For the purposes of this paper, we chose the key distribution protocol as an
example because it incorporates unicast messages addressed to a particular
group member as well as broadcast messages addressed to all group members.
The group key in GDH is computed from secret contributions from each
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group member. For this purpose, each group member Mi has a nonce Ni.
Group member position numbers (the “i” in “Mi”) are artifacts of the key
distribution algorithm. They are somewhat stable but can change because of
changes in group membership.
The group key is computed by raising the exponentiation base g to the
product of all nonces Πi=1..nNi of group members. The exponentiation base
is known to every group member, whereas the individual nonces are secret to
the particular group members. In a message exchange, members communicate
partial key values that keep their secret and still allow other group members
to compute a shared group key.
Figure 1 illustrates the communication between group members for a group
of size 4. The member M1 sends out an array consisting of the exponentiation
base g and gN1 to its neighbor M2. Every intermediate member receives such
an array, multiplies each array element with its own nonce, and copies the ﬁrst
array element of the received message into its outgoing message. In this way,
the length of arrays sent between group members always equals the position
number of the receiving member. This “upﬂow” phase of GDH consists of
unicast messages. Finally, the last group member receives an array of length
n from which it computes the group key by raising the ﬁrst array element to
the power Nn. After this, Mn replies in a multicast to the group with an array
of partial key values (“downﬂow” phase) that include its nonce Nn. The other
group members can compute the group key from this multicast message by
raising the appropriate array element to the power of their nonce. The intent
of this protocol is that all group members share the group key g
∏
Ni .
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Fig. 1. Overview: Group Diﬃe-Hellman Key Distribution
2.1 Role Separation
In the GDH protocol, we can distinguish three diﬀerent roles, in the sense of
distinct behavioral sequences – the sequence of messages sent and received.
22
Denker and Millen
The roles are M1, Mi, and Mn. M1 is the role of M1, the group member
who initiates the key distribution. The member Mn in role Mn is the last
member of the group, the one whose position number equals the group size.
All other members are in role Mi. (There is only one role Mi, not one for each
i from 2 to n − 1.) The roles are diagrammed schematically in Figure 2. A
multicast message is indicated by terminating the message arrow with a box,
as illustrated in the broadcast message from Mn. A message destination of
“M” means that the role of its destination is ambiguous.
M
M1
M
M
broadcast
upflow upflow
upflow
broadcast
Mi
upflow
broadcast
Mn
Fig. 2. Key Distribution Protocol – Overview
The schematic role diagram in Figure 2 can be elaborated by showing the
contents of messages in more detail. This is done in Figures 3 and 4.
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These diagrams abstract away many important details, such as how re-
ceived messages are stored, when new key contributions Ni are computed,
and how messages are composed. Those details are part of the MuCAPSL
speciﬁcation and can be found in [7]. The graphical notation is only meant
to give an overview of the relevant protocol roles and to illustrate the main
message ﬂow and message content.
2.2 The MuCAPSL Speciﬁcation
Since our focus is on term rewriting as in MuCIL, we do not include the entire
MuCAPSL speciﬁcation here. However, it may help to see a partial sample,
so here is the role speciﬁcation for M1.
PROTOCOL KeyDist;
ROLE M1: GDHAgent;
ASSUMPTIONS
pos=1;
HOLDS Nxt;
MESSAGES
NEW N;
-> Nxt: g^N, g;
<- KD;
Kn=KD[1]^N;
END M1;
...
END KeyDist;
In this speciﬁcation, KD is the entire downﬂow array; only its ﬁrst element
is needed for M1 to compute the new group key Kn.
3 Multiset Term Rewriting Semantics
As illustrated with the GDH protocol, there are a variety of diﬀerent events in
group communication protocols. These events include sending of multicast and
unicast messages, receiving and checking the content of a message, and internal
(cryptographic) computations that alter a group member’s state. All these
events must be modeled accordingly in the underlying semantics to capture
the meaning of the group communication protocol.
In the MuCIL approach, protocols are understood as state transition sys-
tems. Each protocol event causes the system to undergo a state transition. A
protocol is described through a set of transition rules of the form
F1, ..., Fk −→ ∃X1, ..., Xm : G1, ..., Gn,
where each Fi and Gj is a “fact.” Facts are atomic formulas of the form
P (t1, ..., tr) where P is a predicate symbol and the arguments ti are terms.
A term is constructed from constants, variables, and function symbols. Vari-
ables, constants, and functions are typed. “Constant” and “variable” have
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their usual meaning for logical formulas; variables may be instantiated. Func-
tion symbols represent computations such as encryption used in the protocol.
In protocol modeling, facts are used to express the entrance of a process
into a state, or the transmission of a message. The state of the network
environment is a multiset of ground facts, and a rule is eligible to ﬁre when
the facts on the left side of the rule can be matched with facts in the multiset.
When a rule ﬁres, the matching facts in the multiset are removed from it and
replaced by the facts on the right side of the rule, instantiated according to
the substitution required by the pattern match. Removing a fact from the
multiset reduces its multiplicity by one, if it was more than one.
Existentially quantiﬁed variables in the right-side facts are instantiated
with new constants, as for a skolemization step in logic. In a cryptographic
protocol model, these variables represent nonces, so it is essential to instantiate
them with fresh values.
The origins of the multiset term-rewriting approach for cryptographic pro-
tocols appeared in [8] and [3].
3.1 MuCIL Notation
As a language for expressing protocol transition rules, MuCIL has a particular
syntax and a particular choice of predicate symbols used in facts.
Rules in MuCIL, as well as facts and terms, are expressed in functional
notation representing a tree structure with labeled nodes having zero or more
ordered children. There are two kinds of rules in MuCIL—unconditional rules
of the form
rule(facts(...),ids(...),facts(...))
and conditional rewrite rules of the form
rule(facts(...),ids(...),facts(...),if(...)).
The “ids” term lists the quantiﬁed variables. The “if” clause contains a
boolean term that may be complex, including conjunctions of boolean terms
or other boolean operators.
Conditional rules were introduced for convenience. A single conditional
rule can, in principle, be simulated by a sequence of unconditional rules, where
the ﬁrst transition creates a state that carries the result of evaluating the test
condition, and the subsequent transition has a left-side fact that requires a
true result. This sequence of two rules can be made atomic by a semaphore
tactic. Conditional rules, however, are easier to produce and understand.
In this paper, for readability, we use the rule form facts −→ (∃ vars) facts
if test in place of the oﬃcial rule(facts(facts),ids(vars),facts(facts),if(test))
(and similarly for the unconditional rule). MuCIL has a convention that only
terms with plural function names (e.g., facts, ids, terms) have a variable num-
ber of arguments. The form terms(...) appears so often that, for readability
in this paper, it is replaced by [ ... ].
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3.2 Facts
For multicast protocol modeling, three fact predicates are used: mmsg for
messages, state for the state of a protocol role process, which we call an
“agent,” and member for the state of a group member.
A message fact has the form mmsg([...]), where the terms represent the
message ﬁelds. We do not keep sender or receiver addresses in message facts
because these addresses make no diﬀerence from the viewpoint of security
analysis, since an active attacker can always forge addresses. There is also
no diﬀerence between a unicast message and a multicast message, since an
attacker can either rebroadcast a unicast message, or prevent any message,
multicast or not, from reaching more than one, or any, destination.
Facts that represent the state of an agent in a protocol role have at least
four arguments:
state(ident, role, state-label, [...]).
The ﬁrst argument is the group member, the second is its role, the third is a
sequence number or other label for the state, and the fourth is a list of terms
representing the transient local memory of the agent, such as nonces, session
keys, and the names of other group members.
A typical left-side agent state fact in a rule might look like
state(M1,KeyDistM1,2,[ ])
Here, M1 is not a role name, but rather a variable of type GDHAgent, even
though this identiﬁer was borrowed from the role name given in the speciﬁ-
cation. The role name KeyDistM1 is a constant produced automatically by
combining the protocol and role names. We have to do this because role names
are not unique across protocols. This example has no component terms be-
cause the role does not need any session-speciﬁc memory; it uses and modiﬁes
the group member memory only.
An important conceptual feature of state memory components is that their
values are either undeﬁned or “held,” and, once held, cannot change. This is
true because state variables in protocol speciﬁcations are thought of as having
a single value for a protocol session, and then disappear with the termination
of the protocol process when the session is ended. (In general, we use the term
“state variable” to refer to the name used in a MuCAPSL speciﬁcation for an
agent state component.)
We cluster state component values into a single terms list in the fourth
argument because those values are protocol speciﬁc, while every role of every
protocol has the ﬁrst three.
The state of a group member includes such components as the member’s
identity, position number, and the size of the group. The group member state
fact has the form
member(ident,[...]).
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The identity of a member is an object of a particular ﬁxed type “GroupMem-
ber,” which is deﬁned in MuCIL to have owner and groupid attributes. Thus,
the group member is an abstraction allowing a single user (of type Principal)
acting as the owner to participate independently as a member of a number of
diﬀerent groups.
Because group member state components persist across protocol sessions,
they are never considered undeﬁned, but are always treated as held. How-
ever, unlike agent state variables, they may be updated during any protocol
session. In fact, they could conceivably be updated several times by one role
or concurrently by two or more agents of the same group member.
The state components after the member identity in the state depend on
the group protocol architecture. The particular set of components for a given
group is declared in a MuCAPSL speciﬁcation as part of the deﬁnition of a
subtype of GroupMember. Thus, we declare a subtype GDHAgent of Group-
Member with the following list of named attributes: pos, n, Kn, N, Nxt,
KU, KD. These store information, respectively, about the group member’s po-
sition in the group, the group size, the latest group key, the secret nonce it
contributes to the group key, the address of the upﬂow neighbor, and arrays
for the upﬂow and downﬂow partial keys.
The names of the attributes are meaningful in the MuCAPSL speciﬁcation,
but not in the MuCIL rules. However, the translator attempts to make the
rules it generates more readable by using attribute names (as well as state
variable names) as the names of corresponding dummy variables in the rules.
Thus, a typical left-side member fact in a MuCIL rule looks like
member(M1,[pos,n,Kn,N,Nxt,KU,KD]).
4 Events and Rule Generation
State transition rules are needed for protocol actions, attacker actions, and
sometimes also for actions related to deﬁnition and detection of security goals.
We only discuss protocol rules here, since the others are either not protocol
speciﬁc, or they are constrained by the capabilities of diﬀerent analysis tools.
A MuCAPSL group protocol speciﬁcation usually speciﬁes more than one
protocol, since the same group responds to diﬀerent protocols for such func-
tions as key distribution, adding a member, removing a member, group split,
or group merge. Within each protocol, there are several roles – three in the
case of the GDH key distribution protocol, for example. Each role in each
protocol is speciﬁed separately as a list of events involving messages and com-
putational actions. For each role we generate a sequence of state transition
rules, beginning with an initialization rule to create the ﬁrst agent state.
In MuCAPSL we distinguish three diﬀerent message events: receiving a
message, sending a unicast message, or sending a multicast message. The
concrete syntax of MuCAPSL events is not important here; it is covered in
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[10]. At an abstract syntax level, the three message events are
recv(terms(...)), send(ident, terms(...)), mcast(terms(...))
As remarked earlier, MuCIL ignores the diﬀerence between a send and an
mcast. The diﬀerence between a send and a receive is that a send generates
a transition like
member(M, [...]), state(M, ...) −→ member(M, [...]), state(M, ...), mmsg([...])
and a receive generates a transition like
member(M, [...]), state(M, ...), mmsg([...]) −→ member(M, [...]), state(M, ...)
In both cases, the agent state label is incremented. A receive transition may
also modify components of the member and agent states. Note that the mem-
ber and agent state facts are tied together by reference to the same group
member.
According to the semantics of rule ﬁring, a receive rule removes the mes-
sage fact from the multiset. If the message is supposed to be multicast, how
does more than one group member receive it? There are three choices for the
answer. One possibility is to change the rule to include the same message fact
on the right, so that it will be preserved for other recipients. This redundancy
was considered undesirable because it clutters the rule generator output. Al-
ternatively, we could just make an exception in the MuCIL rule semantics
for message facts. Finally, we observe that no exception is necessary to pre-
serve state reachability, since the standard attacker is assumed to be able to
duplicate messages.
MuCAPSL also has equational events term = term, which generate rules
having no message at all, only a state modiﬁcation. An equation may be
either a test or an assignment. If it is a test, the equation reappears in the
rule in the if-condition, and the only state modiﬁcation is to increment the
state label in the agent state. If it is an assignment, member and agent state
components are modiﬁed.
A special event is needed to cause the value of an attribute to be updated
with a fresh value, as required, for example, in GDH key distribution when a
group member needs a new nonce. This is the event NEW X in MuCAPSL, or
new(X) in the abstract syntax. Fresh values are generated for state variables
wherever they are ﬁrst used, if they are not initially held or previously received.
MuCAPSL has a few limited constructs for ﬂow of control. We tried to
avoid supporting IF-THEN-ELSE, with the argument that when branching
occurs, the protocol should end a role and start one of two new roles, with the
choice information stored in an attribute. However, conditional branching,
like other execution ﬂow constructs, can be supported in MuCIL using rules
that change the state label, with the existing fact types.
Something like DO-UNTIL is often needed in a multicast group protocol,
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although it does not show up in the GDH example. It is needed when the
leader of a group must wait for responses from some designated number of
other members before proceeding, to obtain a majority vote, or a consensus,
or an agreement, or enough shares of a split secret to regenerate it.
An ABORT event is a way to bypass the normal requirement for a role—
that it is expecting only one kind of message in each state. Some group
protocols broadcast an abort message that halts whatever role is being played
by each member. An abort message goes to a separate role, which issues an
ABORT event to halt the existing agent or agents of that group member.
4.1 Implementability
The rule generator translates MuCAPSL events into rewrite rules. During
this process, an implementability check must be passed that decides whether
the speciﬁcation is implementable.
The implementability algorithm determines what an agent must do to
send or receive a message (multicast or unicast), and passes judgment on
whether the explicit and implied actions are possible, given the current state
of the agent. The state transition rules are, in eﬀect, the product of the
implementability algorithm. A failure of implementability implies that a rule
cannot be generated that correctly models the event.
The key concepts for implementability are computability, receivability, and
invertibility. A term is computable by an agent if the necessary variables are
held (or can be generated on the ﬂy, in the case of nonces or session keys) and
all functions involved in complex terms are accessible by the acting agent.
Functions are accessible if they are public, which is the normal case, or
private to the acting agent. Private functions are local to a user, but they are
not state components because they are constant, and because they are often
associated with the principal owning the group member rather than the group
member. They are used to hold permanent information such as the long-term
secret key of a principal, sk(A), which is private to A. Thus, sk(Alice) is
computable by Alice but not by Bob. Private functions are declared with the
PRIVATE property in MuCAPSL.
A term representing a message ﬁeld is receivable if the agent holds enough
variables and subterms to perform the implied pattern match. A pattern
match on a complex term implies the ability to extract the components of it, by
inverting the operation used to synthesize the term. Concatenations are always
invertible, and encryptions are invertible if the proper key is computable.
Thus, in order to receive a message speciﬁed as ped(pk(A),X), the secret key
sk(A) of A is needed, and the protocol would be incorrect if it speciﬁed that
this message is received by a diﬀerent principal B.
In the next sections we present some details on how each event is processed
during rule generation. We start with initialization rules that are generated
before processing any events.
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4.2 State Initialization
State initialization rules are those rules that do not have a state predicate
on the left side. There are initialization rules for member state facts and for
agent state facts.
The translator generates initial agent state facts but not member state
facts. A member initialization rule looks like
−→ member(M,[A,B,...]) if(...).
where M is of a subtype of GroupMember having attributes A,B,..., and so
on. We assume that there is only one member state per principal and group.
This assumption is important because it eliminates ambiguity as to which
member state is aﬀected by role transition rules. This uniqueness assumption
should be expressed by the if-condition. It is awkward to express because it
refers to the entire multiset of facts. The rule generator does not attempt to
produce member initialization rules.
There is one initialization rule per role to generate the corresponding ini-
tial agent state fact. In MuCIL we generate initial state facts with all state
variables, some of which might be undeﬁned in the initial state and will be
assigned only in later steps of the protocol, as their values are generated or
received in messages.
As it happens, no state variables are used in the key distribution protocol
(deﬁned or otherwise) and therefore the initial state predicate for the role M1
is state(M1,KeyDistM1,0,[]).
A role speciﬁcation may have “assumptions” that constrain initialization.
There are two kinds of assumptions: “holds” assumptions that say that some
state variables have meaningful initial values (but not specifying those values),
and other assumptions, written as boolean expressions, that give or constrain
values of attributes or held state variables.
An assumption on member attributes serves the purpose of identifying
which roles it may execute. For example, in GDH, role M1 is the only role
possible when pos = 1. Assumptions constraining attribute values become
if-conditions for the initialization rule for that role.
Whether a state variable is initially undeﬁned or held is important infor-
mation for the rule generator, since an event that uses the value of a state
variable is not implementable if that variable is not yet held. The rule gener-
ator knows which variables are initially held because they are assumed held,
and it determines which initially undeﬁned variables become held later as a re-
sult of protocol events. The held status of a state variable is not explicit in the
rules, but it is implicit in the determination of which rules are implementable.
The initial rules for the three roles in the key distribution protocol, distin-
guished by the value of the position number attribute pos, are
member(M1,[pos,...])
−→ state(M1,KeyDistM1,0,[ ]), member(M1,[pos,...]),
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if(eqn(pos,1))
member(Mi,[pos,n,...])
−→ state(Mi,KeyDistMi,0,[ ]), member(Mi,[pos,n,...]),
if(and(isgrtr(pos,1),isless(pos,n)))
member(Mn,[pos,n,...])
−→ state(Mn,KeyDistMn,0,[ ]), member(Mn,[pos,n,...]),
if(eqn(pos,n))
The ﬁrst and last could have been written with no if-condition by placing
1 or n, respectively, in place of pos, replacing the condition test with a pattern
match.
One might also ask whether it is possible to create more than one agent
instance for the same role. This is possible with the formalism but usually
considered undesirable. The protocol speciﬁcation can prevent concurrent role
duplication by explicitly adding a semaphore attribute to the member state.
This sort of concern is described further below when we discuss the ABORT
operation.
4.3 Send and Mcast
It is easy to generate a rule that sends a message with terms X1, ..., Xn. First,
test that each of X1, ..., Xn is computable. If so, the rule simply increments
the state label and adds the message to the right-side facts. The sending of
g^N,g in GDH KeyDist role M1 produces the rule
member(M1,[..., N, ...])), state(M1,KeyDistM1,1,[ ])
−→
member(M1,[..., N,...]),
state(M1,KeyDistM1,2,[ ]), mmsg([exp(g,N),g])
4.4 New
When an attribute receives a fresh value due to a NEW event or when a state
variable that is a nonce is ﬁrst used, the new value is created by a transition
rule in which that attribute or variable appears in the existentially quantiﬁed
list.
In the GDH example, the agent in role M1 must generate a new nonce N
before it can send out the partial key to its neighbor. In MuCAPSL this is
represented as NEW N, parsed to new(N).
The following is the rule generated for the NEW N event of the agent M1 in
the KeyDist protocol.
member(M1,[..., N,...])), state(M1,KeyDistM1,0,[ ])
−→ (∃N!) member(M1,[..., N!,...]), state(M1,KeyDistM1,1,[ ])
Note that we had to invent a new dummy variable name N ! for the new
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value of N .
4.5 Data Types and Terms
Before we explain rule generation for other kinds of events, we need to say
more about the construction of terms used in rule facts. Certain object types
and function signatures are considered “built in” to MuCAPSL and therefore
to MuCIL. The MuCAPSL translator is given a prelude containing abstract
data type speciﬁcations for built-in symbols, and the user is allowed to supply
additional declarations.
In the prelude, the most general object type is Object, and its most im-
portant subtypes are Boolean and Field. An object of type Field can appear
as a message content ﬁeld. Field has a subtype Atom containing familiar ob-
ject types such as Principal, Nonce, and Nat (natural numbers), and some
cryptography-speciﬁc types such as Pkey (public key). Nonatomic ﬁelds are
formed, for example, by concatenation using the constructor cat. The pre-
lude declares the public-key encryption operator ped and the symmetric-key
encryption and decryption operators se and sd. Arithmetic operations are
deﬁned on type Skey for ﬁnite-length symmetric keys.
In multicast group protocols, there is often a need for variable-length mes-
sages or message ﬁelds, as well as a need for attributes holding an array-like
sequence of values (e.g., arrays of partial keys in upﬂow and downﬂow messages
of GDH). For this reason we have introduced the Array type and subtypes as
required. Arrays are indexed by natural numbers, and their elements are of
type Field. There are subtypes Sarray with elements of type Skey, and some
others. (Array subtypes cannot presently be deﬁned parametrically in Mu-
CAPSL, so we need speciﬁc subtypes for arrays with diﬀerent element types.)
Arrays have operators such as at to extract the ith element, with to assign a
value to the ith element, proj to project to a contiguous subsequence of an
array, acat to concatenate two arrays, and size to determine the length of an
array. There are elementwise operators to simplify common group computa-
tions, such as A^^N in MuCAPSL, with abstract syntax aexp(A,N), creating
an array of A values each raised to the power N.
It is also possible, in MuCAPSL, to deﬁne group member attributes that
are functions, that is, they are indexed over an arbitrary datatype. For in-
stance, a key table of a group member in which a shared secret key for every
other group member is stored could be declared as a function
skTable(GroupMember): Skey.
Including this function as an attribute allows us to reassign values for each
table entry individually. Unlike arrays, functions are not objects of a datatype.
However, they are handled similarly for purposes of rule generation.
The next two sections explain rule generation for receive events and equa-
tional events.
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4.6 Rule Generation for Receive
Receiving a message is conceptually complex in a language where the received
terms are interpreted as patterns, and the state variables they mention may
or may not be modiﬁed as a result of receiving the message.
Suppose that a protocol generates a nonce N which is sent ﬁrst from user
A, who generates it, to user B, and then returned from B to A. When B
receives N , it is a new value that will be stored in B’s state. When A receives
N from B, the value received in the message will be compared with the value A
originally generated, to test for possible errors or interference in the protocol.
For state variables, one can determine which action is appropriate simply by
observing whether the state variable is undeﬁned or held. For attributes,
either action is possible and might be intended in a given message, and the
speciﬁcation must indicate explicitly which action is intended. In MuCAPSL,
the unadorned attribute N in a received message is supposed to be stored,
while the syntactic form ?N indicates that the value of N in the message is
supposed to equal the old value already stored, and a comparison test should
be performed. The abstract syntax for the preﬁxed question mark is compare(
), but the “compare” is a translator directive that is not seen in the ﬁnal
MuCIL.
recv N
N
recv N send N
?N
A
new N
send N
B
Fig. 5. Receiving
Thus, if N is an attribute, the event recv([N]) is interpreted as an as-
signment. The following is a sketch of a rule implementing it, for some role
roleM in state 4.
member(M,[...N...]), state(M,roleM,4,[...]), mmsg([N!])
−→ member(M,[...N!...]), state(M,roleM,5,[...])
Note that we had to invent a new variable name N! for the value of N in
the message.
If the receive event is recv([compare(N)]), the same rule is generated,
except that there is no need for N!; it uses N everywhere. Thus, the state
change consists only in incrementing the state label, and it occurs only when
the comparison succeeds, that is, the message contains the value of N that is
already in the member state.
If N is a state variable instead of an attribute, there are two diﬀerences: the
N is found in the state fact instead of the member fact, and the rule generator
can detect a mismatch between the action indicated by the use of “?” and the
action implied by the undeﬁned/held status of the variable. In the case of a
mismatch, the rule generator can produce the correct rule and give the user a
warning.
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From the above discussion, it should be clear how to generate the rule
for a receive of a single attribute or state variable, which may be qualiﬁed as
needed by the “compare” operator “?”.
Receiving a functional term
Receiving a function term recv([f(s, t)]) requires the agent to be able to
pattern-match f(s, t). This means that the receiver understands the structure
of the term well enough to either duplicate the computation or learn the
value of the atomic components it cannot compute. Algorithmically, this is
expressed in the notions of receivability and invertibility.
One possibility is that the function value can be computed by the recipient
from its own state and compared with the function value in the message. This
is appropriate if all the variables appearing in the message term have the
“compare” preﬁx. The result is a transition rule that changes nothing except
the state label.
Otherwise, the function must be inverted. Invertibility of a function is
expressed in MuCAPSL, as in CAPSL, by a special axiom. For example,
invertible(ped(pk(A),X),X,sk(A))
says that ped is invertible in its second argument X if the agent can compute the
decryption key sk(A). Concatenation is invertible in both arguments (with
two axioms), and other functions (such as the hash function sha) are not
modeled as being invertible and have no invertibility axioms. Thus, sha(X)
is receivable only when the term is computable from the held value of X.
If a function term like f(s, t) can be inverted by the acting agent to re-
trieve s or t, then receiving f(s, t) reduces to receiving s or t or both, if
possible. Thus, if sk(A) is computable, ped(pk(A),X) is receivable only if
X is receivable, and the transition rule includes the eﬀects of receiving X. A
term like cat(X,Y) is invertible to both X and Y, and the transition reﬂects
the recursively accumulated eﬀects of receiving both, in left-to-right order.
Array and function attributes lead to special cases because of the peculiar
property that one can modify a named complex object while providing only
one component of it. The array reference expressed in MuCAPSL as A[N]
with the abstract syntax at(A,N) is not invertible in the axiomatic sense, since
neither the whole array A, nor (generally) the index N, can be determined from
at(A,N). Nor is the term computable, since it refers to a new value. (The
old value would be referred to as ?A[N].) Yet this term should be considered
receivable, since the receiving agent can store the value given in the message
into the appropriate array element.
Receiving an event recv([at(A,N)]), if A is an attribute, results in a check
whether N is computable, and generates a rule like
member(M,[...A....]), state(M,roleM,3,[...]), mmsg([V])
−→ member(M,[...with(A,N,V)...]), state(M,roleM,4,[...])
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where V in mmsg takes the place of at(A,N) in the message, and with updates
an array by replacing one element at a given index. Notice that V is a new
dummy variable of type Field. It is not allowable to receive an event at(A,N)
if A is a state variable because state variables can be set only once, and that
must be with an entire array object.
There are some other cases that we do not have the space to present here,
such as the similar handling of function attributes.
4.7 Rule for Equational Event
An equational event eqn(x, y) can be a test or an assignment, depending
on the left-side term x. The right side of the equation is always tested for
computability. Generally, an equational event eqn(x, y) is a test, with the
following exceptions in which it is interpreted as an assignment:
(i) eqn(X, t) where X is an undeﬁned state variable
(ii) eqn(X, t) where X is an attribute
(iii) eqn(at(A, i), t) where A is an attribute of type Array (or a subtype)
(iv) eqn(proj(A,L,N), B) where A is an attribute of type Array and B is of
type array
(v) eqn(F (x), y) where F is a function attribute
(vi) eqn(con(x, y), z) or eqn(cat(x, y), z), which get special treatment; see
below.
Tests are translated into rules with the equation in the condition of the
rule, similar to the rules for test in the previous section.
Rules for assignments of undeﬁned state variables or atomic attributes are
similar to the assignment rules for receive events in the previous section. The
only diﬀerence is that there is no message fact on the left side of the rule since
these assignments are internal state transitions.
An equational event with a concatenation on the left side produces two
new events, namely, eqn(x,head(z)) and eqn(y,tail(z) in the case of con,
and eqn(x,first(z)) and eqn(y,rest(z)) in the case of cat.
Events eqn(at(A, i), t), eqn(proj(A,L,N), B), and eqn(F (t), t′) with nonatomic
attributes A and F , respectively, are interpreted as assignments. The assign-
ment of a term t to an array element at(A, i) is modeled by the following
rule:
member(M,[...A...]), state(M,...,n,[...])
−→ member(M,[...with(A,i,t)...]), state(M,...,n+1,[...]).
It is also checked that i is computable by the agent. The rule means that
we substitute the old value at position i in attribute A with the new term t.
For the event eqn(proj(A,L,N), B), we check that L and N are com-
putable and replace the original array A with a new array that has been
computed by projecting the original array A to two subarrays, the subarray
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from index 1 to index L− 1, and the subarray from index N +1 to the end of
A, and then concatenate those subarrays with B. The corresponding rule is
member(M, [...A...]), state(M, ..., n, [...])
−→ member(M, [...A′...]), state(M, ..., n+ 1, [...]),
where A′ is deﬁned as
acat(proj(A,1,pls(L,mns(1))),B,proj(A,pls(i,1),size(A))).
For an attribute F , the event eqn(F (t), t′) is handled similarly. Our solu-
tion introduces a predicate update for function symbols that is used to indicate
that the value of a function is changed.
member(M, [...F...]), state(M, ..., n, [...])
−→ member(M, [...update(F, t, t′)...]), state(M, ..., n+ 1, [...]).
However, this is cheating, because there is no function type in MuCAPSL.
Function symbols like F do not have a type, so update is not a real function,
because it does not have a legal signature. Depending on the expressiveness of
a tool or analysis technique, means to handle update predicates in rules have
to be found individually in the context of each analysis technique or tool.
4.8 Rule for Iterative Loop
The parser translates an iterative loop into dountil(events(e1, ..., ek), c),
where the sequence e1, . . . , ek of events is to be executed until the condition c
becomes true.
The issue in a DO-UNTIL event is that one of the events ei may set a
previously undeﬁned state variable during the ﬁrst loop execution, but then
the same event is a test on that variable in subsequent executions.
To handle this we create two state sequences for the loop when the state
variable changes from undeﬁned to deﬁned in the body of the loop. The
ﬁrst sequence is used only once, and the second state sequence is used for all
subsequent executions. This ﬂow is illustrated in Figure 6.
e
e
not(c)
c
n
1e
e
not(c)
c
n
1
Fig. 6. DO-UNTIL Flow with Undeﬁned State Variables
The rule generator can tell whether a state variable becomes deﬁned by
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saving the current state of all state variables at the beginning of the loop
and comparing it with the current state after the ﬁrst loop execution. Nested
DO-UNTILs can be handled recursively.
4.9 Abort
The simplest form of role speciﬁcation is a sequence of send and receive events.
In these protocols, only one message type is expected in a given state. Some-
times it is desired to allow a group member or leader to multicast a special
interrupt message telling other members to leave their current state and return
to some stable state. Group members receive (or fail to receive) this message
and act on it in some protocol-speciﬁc way.
This behavior is represented in MuCAPSL by adding an additional Abort
role that begins by waiting to receive the interrupt message, which is an
ordinary message of a protocol-speciﬁc format. The receive is followed by
an ABORT event, which is then followed by any additional protocol-speciﬁc
events executed under the assumption that the group member executing this
role has terminated all of its other role agents.
The rewrite-rule version of this is simpler if a group member is single
threaded, that is, it can execute only one agent at a time, other than the
Abort role agent. The ABORT event in the Abort role is translated to a rule
like
member(M,[...]),state(M,Abort,1,[ ]),state(M,R,N,T)
−→ member(M,[...]),state(M,Abort,2,[ ])
where M, R, N, and T are all variables, so that any single nonabort agent state
is matched and terminated. The single-threaded property can be guaranteed
by adding an invisible semaphore attribute, and modifying initialization tran-
sitions (except for the Abort role) to test and set it, and terminating transi-
tions to reset it. In MuCAPSL, giving a GroupMember subtype a MUTEX
property causes the semaphore to be added by the translator.
It is also possible to implement an abort event when multiple roles, or
multiple instances of any role, can be executed concurrently by a single group
member. In that case the semaphore keeps count of the number of agents, and
the abort role waits until the semaphore has reached zero before continuing.
5 Plans
To make MuCAPSL useful to protocol analysts, we need to make translation
tools as well as documentation available. We are currently in the process of
ﬁnishing the MuCAPSL-MuCIL translator that parses and typechecks Mu-
CAPSL speciﬁcations and generates MuCIL rules for the protocol. In partic-
ular, we will add an optimization stage to combine successive MuCIL rules
when possible, as we have done for CIL.
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In the near future we will investigate goal speciﬁcations. Secrecy notions
such as “perfect forward secrecy”, and “forward/backward access control”
need to be formalized in MuCAPSL and MuCIL. The capabilities of the trans-
lator for representing goals, execution scenarios, and an attacker model will
be gradually expanded. Veriﬁcation and model checking techniques have to
be re-investigated and extended for group communication protocols.
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